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Delayed DNS: Crippling Crypto-Ransomware 
JONATHAN GRAHAM, OCAD University 
This research seeks to expose a major weakness in Crypto-ransomware by modeling it as four integral 
sub-systems consisting of: An Agent, a Command and Control Service (CNC), an anonymous payment 
channel (APC) and an obfuscated command channel (OCC).  We will show that most modern counter-
measures focus on either the Agent or the CNC subsystems and usually in a reactive way exposing the 
target to undue risk.  However, by disrupting this fourth component – the Obfuscated Command Channel 
– we can proactively and safely defeat a wide variety of crypto-ransomware. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Crypto-ransomware is broadly defined as a piece of malicious software which attempts to extort 
money from a computer user by encrypting the files or documents stored on their machine. [1] 
Historically crypto-ransomware dates to 1989[2] when Dr. Joseph Popp created the AIDS 
Trojan.  A program mailed out on floppy disk to 7000 subscribers of PC Business World [3] 
which, when run on an unsuspecting person’s PC, would encrypt the user’s filenames, making 
them difficult to identify. Moving forward 28 years we see WannaCry, which affected 300,000 
machines across 150 countries including crippling the National Health Service for several days 
[4].    
 
What happened in twenty years to make this kind of software so much more dangerous?  While 
there are many environmental factors which played a part such as an astronomical increase in 
the number of machines connected to the internet, an increase in software complexity leading 
to remotely exploitable security problems, as well the rise in awareness of crypto-currencies 
like Bitcoin [5].  This paper argues that, even with these things in place, Dr. Popp’s Trojan could 
not have affected the world in the significant way that WannaCry did in 2017.   
 
2 ANATOMY OF SUCCESSFUL CRYPTO-RANSOMWARE 
2.1 Four Necessary Parts 
2.1.1 Agent. In our model we define this as the active part of the system. It is responsible for 
encrypting the target machine, contacting any external systems it on which it depends (such as 
a command and control system), directing victims to provide payment and finally decrypting 
the target machine when payment is supplied.  Malware comes in many different forms and 
employs various attack vectors.   Dr. Popp’s earliest attempt was a simple trojan where the user 
had to be fooled into executing the program on their machine.  In this respect modern 
approaches like Cryptolocker (2013) operate in much the same way.  Instead of attempting to 
trick a target into inserting a disk they are instead tricked into executing an email attachment. 
[5].  In this sense Dr. Popp’s approach is still valid today.  This isn’t the only attack vector 
utilized by successful crypto-ransomware agents.  The Internet-crippling WannaCry was spread 
via a known flaw in Microsoft’s SMB file sharing protocol [6].  This caused WannaCry to 
operate more like a worm than Cryptolocker, whose behavior was closer to that of a phishing 
attack.  
 
In addition to the clear point that without some kind of agent we would have no 
attacker to defeat, it needs to be stressed that this software cannot be entirely self-contained if it 
is to be successful. Any software which contains all the necessary information to both encrypt 
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and decrypt the target machine is vulnerable to analysis.  Scraper, TeslaCrypt and Radamant are 
examples of ransomware which failed because researchers were able to examine the program 
and find a weakness in either the encryption system or the keys themselves [7][8][9].  The need 
to separate some portion of the encryption/decryption system into component parts was 
recognized as early as 1996 when researchers Moti Yung and Adam Young published analysis of 
Dr. Popp’s trojan.  They noted that it suffered from its use of a symmetric key cipher. 
Furthermore they suggested that such attacks could be drastically improved by using an 
asymmetric cipher like RSA [10].  That said, even a system with a single asymmetric key pair or 
that programmatically generates asymmetric keys would also be quickly defeated.  As the agent 
is also responsible for decrypting the target machine, then either the key or the key-generation 
algorithm must be stored in the agent itself and could eventually be recovered through analysis.  
To “succeed” in the same way that WannaCry did, what is needed is a system which produces 
unique keys for every attack without depending on the agent’s own code. AIDS took less than 
two months to crack. Cryptolocker existed for almost a year and was only defeated due to the 
efforts of Operation Tovar by recovering the master keys from the Cryptolocker distribution 
servers.  During that period, it took in an estimated $27 million dollars [5]. 
 
2.1.2 Command and Control Service (CNC).   We have already established that the agent 
requires a source of cryptographic keys which cannot be discovered through code analysis.  
This is, in effect, what the CNC does.   In the case of Cryptolocker the agent makes a request for 
a cryptographic key pair from the CNC server.  The server generates the pair but sends only 
one to the agent.  The agent then begins encrypting the system by first generating a symmetric 
key cypher for each file then encrypting each file with its own symmetric key.  Finally, it 
encrypts the symmetric key with the asymmetric key provided by the CNC server.  Once 
payment is recognized, the agent asks the CNC server to release the other half of the key pair, 
stores a copy on the target’s desktop and then attends to the tasks of decrypting the target’s 
files.  Without the CNC server we have no way to encrypt our files, so success is dependent on 
our agent being able to find it, but its location on the Internet cannot be static, because that 
would make it vulnerable to IP or DNS blocking.  
 
2.1.3 Anonymous Payment Service (APS). Many sources consider the rise of crypto-currencies 
key in the development of crypto-ransomware [5].  Whether this a true cause-and-effect 
relationship or not, anyone who is taking funds illegally would need to protect their identity.  
Prior to the rise of bitcoin, earlier ransomware like TROJ_CRYZIP.A required payment in E-
gold, a now defunct e-currency which, due to the privacy it afforded users, was a favorite for 
online criminals [11].   
 
2.1.4 Obfuscated Command Channel (OCC). Once we have a way of encrypting the machine, a 
separate source of cryptographic keys and a way to secure payment without getting arrested or 
our assets seized, all our agent requires to be successful is a method to get those keys and start 
doing the work.  As noted in section 2.1.2, the CNC server needs to avoid IP or domain blocking.  
Additionally, section 2.1.1 implies that we expect our agent to be examined. Therefore, we may 
conclude that successful crypto-ransomware can’t employ any simple pool of DNS or IP 
addresses either.  We need something much more complex. It is worth noting that our system 
does not require these transactions to be encrypted.  Instead we need them resistant to an 
analyst predicting exactly where on the Internet our CNC server is going to be.  To this end 
there are two major approaches employed by crypto-ransomware: Tor and Domain Generation 
Algorithms.  
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 Tor is a network designed to hide the location of an electronic transaction.  It achieves 
this using onion routing, effectively passing your traffic through many other computers, each 
one only having limited information about its ultimate destination [12]. While Tor may seem 
like a perfect way to implement an OCC, it may be surprising that it’s employed by so few 
ransomware agents and in fact was entirely unknown until 2014.  At that point the well-known 
blog Malware Don’t Need Coffee published an advertisement from the Darkweb[13]. This 
posting touted a piece of ransomware, which became known as Citroni by researchers of its 
features the most notable was the use of Tor for CNC communications.  Outside of Russia there 
are few known uses of Citroni and even within Russia it is not known to have generated much 
income. There is good reason for this.  While Tor offers a well-understood way to keep the 
location of the CNC service secret it has some drawbacks.  Nodes can be compromised [14] and 
having node control or even network control of a node can lead to deanonymization [15].  As 
well, traffic can be at least partially blocked thus making it an unreliable channel.  Ultimately it 
is an infrastructure heavy solution. Tor requires thousands of nodes to be in operation to offer a 
reasonable guarantee of privacy. 
 
Most successful crypto-ransomware uses a much simpler approach: DGA. The two 
most well-known examples of crypto-ransomware: WannaCry and Cryptolocker both employ 
this technique.  Domain Generation Algorithms are simply methods by which an agent and a 
CNC server can “find” each other by co-opting the Domain Name System (DNS).  To do so the 
agent and server, like spies in a TV drama, need to merely agree to “meet” on the Internet at an 
appointed time and place (DNS address).  This is done by an algorithm which takes as input the 
date (and possibly the time) and returns a DNS address.  For example, if the date was 05/06/2012 
our algorithm could direct us to contact FIVESIXTWENTYTWELVE.COM.  However, 
computers, having a distinct speed advantage over your average TV spy, doesn’t even have to 
be that precise.  Our software agent could conceivably try a hundred or more domain names 
without breaking a sweat.  This, as we discuss later is a key component of what makes DGA 
successful even when the agent is under analysis, but for the sake of this example our algorithm 
could direct our agent to attempt to contact to the CNC server at 
FIVESIXTWENTYTWELVE1.COM, If it doesn’t find the server there it’s algorithm might tell it 
to continue to try FIVESIXTWENTYTWELVE2.COM then FIVESIXTWENTYTWELVE3.COM 
and so on.  All that’s required is for our server to be waiting at one of those domains at the 
given day and time.  This allows for the server to constantly change its IP address and domain 
name to avoid counter-measures. 
  . 
2.3 Countermeasures 
 
2.3.1 Defense against the agent: The methods for foiling the agent are heavily dependent on the 
attack vector employed. For example, agents that attack the local system can be handled by anti-
virus and anti-malware applications.  Vendors of this kind of software are constantly attempting 
to detect new and emergent threats to people’s systems.  Countermeasure falls into two broad 
categories: signature-based or behavioural.  Signature based systems take the bytes that make 
up the agent and by some mechanism (i.e. a hashing function) create a short relatively unique 
set of bytes which represent some part of the file’s binary image.   This is called a signature.  
Anti-virus software keeps a list of signatures matching dangerous software and scans incoming 
information like email attachments or even your entire hard drive.  When a file matches the 
signature, the software takes remedial action because of this signature-based system are very 
accurate. However, since we need an example of the agent in order to generate a signature our 
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system can only react to threats that we already know about.  As WannaCry illustrates, to us 
that signature might arrive too late.  Furthermore, signatures may also be fooled by padding – 
adding extra information to a file or encryption. [16] To better protect users anti-virus software 
usually employs behavioural methods as well.  Instead of looking at what bytes make up the 
agent, the software now examines what the agent does (e.g. re-write a file with a higher amount 
of entropy).  This approach is employed specifically to combat crypto-ransomware by software 
like Sophos’s Intercept X.  That said, the inexact nature of behavioural analysis (zipping files 
and legitimate encryption also increase entropy) causes these kinds of countermeasure have a 
much higher false positive rate. 
 
Network-based attack vectors can be stopped by ordinary networking tools like 
firewalls – blocking port 445 at the edge of your network was a common suggestion to prevent 
WannaCry [17].  Signature and behavioural analysis can be used here as well.  Fox-it, one of the 
groups involved in the takedown of the Cryptolocker servers has produced scripts for the 
popular network monitoring application Bro to check the entropy of SMB transfers [18].  
Effectively telling us if a file being written has been encrypted.  Since encryption must also 
increase entropy any SMB write requests of this kind would be suspect.  With the exception of 
entropy checking, these methods are also reactive to the particular attack vector. And since 
many common activities legitimately increase entropy, doing entropy checks might only be 
useful to warn the user to act, at which point some of our files have already been encrypted. 
 
2.3.2 Defense against command and control service: Disrupting the CNC service is nothing new.  
The so-called WannaCry killswitch [19] is effectively a built-in method of keeping the agent 
from contacting the CNC service.  Check Point, a security hardware/software vendor, 
introduced a “sinkhole” method into their managed security service “ThreatCloud,” which 
blocks CNC traffic [20]. However, both of these methods are reactive and carry the same 
concerns that signature based methods do:  We may not understand the threat until it is too 
late. 
 
2.3.3 Defense against secure payment channel: As Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are 
probably not going away any time soon, the defenders have few options here. The only well-
known examples of a attacks against a payment channel involve denial of payment.  For 
example during the Petya/Not-Petya attack, the agent would provide the target with an email 
address where a target could send their bitcoin wallet ID as proof of payment.  This email 
address happened to be hosted by Posteo, an email provider based in Berlin, Germany.  When 
the administrators realized their system was being used in a malware attack they shut it down 
[22].  Unfortunately while keeping the criminals from getting paid this did little to protect the 
people whose files were now trapped on their machines in an encrypted form. 
 
2.3.2 Defense against obfuscated command channel: Defense against Tor is a well-understood 
idea.  Many firewalls have options for blocking it (or attempting to block it) [23].  DGA is 
another matter.  Since DNS is a service so integral to the operation of Internet applications it is 
likely impossible to shut down or limit and while our trivial example in section 2.14 might seem 
like it’s plausible to simply restrict every address the DGA algorithm can produce.  The reality 
is not so simple.  The Conflicker.A and Conflicker. B worms, which popularized this technique 
before ransomware got a hold of it used an algorithm which generated 250 different domains a 
day.  The Conflicker.C worm would generate 50,000[23].  Attempting to pre-generate every 
address would be difficult.  However, since a server or individual registering 50,000 domains 
might be a bit conspicuous the Conflicker.C’s CNC server only registers a randomly selected 1% 
of these potential addresses, which is easily hidden in the noise of DNS registries.   This doesn’t 
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affect the success rate of the agent though.  It only needs to remain undetected while it waits to 
find the CNC server.   It’s also worth pointing out that even generating the list of domain names 
to block each day still results in another reactive system.   In the case of a wide-spread attack 
this kind of information would arrive well after the damage was done.  
 
However, it is here we suggest a new defensive method.  To avoid DNS- and IP-blocking 
defences.  The OCC absolutely depends on the timely setup of a domain name – in the order of 
hours.  As we will illustrate later on, there are so few services which require access to such 
recently minted domain names that we may be able to defend against virtually all crypto-
ransomware with a DGA-based OCC simply by denying use of DNS addresses that are newly 
created. 
 
3 Methods for delaying DNS resolution. 
 
The DNS standard is like most of the key parts of the internet: Very old.  It was proposed by 
Paul Mockapetris in 1983 and was designed to solve a very specific problem:  Maintaining the 
increasingly complex HOSTS.TXT files [24]. Thus, it did not include any facility for determining 
exactly when a record was created.  There are a few online search engines like SecurityTrails 
[25].  However, these were designed to retrieve historical information.  They are not expected to 
be accurate to a matter of hours. 
One source that should be accurate is the DNS record itself.  Domains that have a different 
cutover point from the parent domain will have a SOA record.  It is recommended by RFC1912 
that the serial number field contains a “last changed time” in the ISO 8601 format [26].  While 
this is a clever idea it depends on too many assumptions:  That every domain is going to have 
its own SOA record and that they follow the standard. 
 
However, there are now several services which, on a subscription basis, provide 
downloadable CSV files containing recent domain registrations or even access to an interactive 
API [27].  Tools like these could be easily scripted into a form which could be consumed by IPS 
tool like Snort or fire off an alert via an IDS tool like Bro. 
3.3 FALSE POSITIVES AND POTENTIAL HARM AND AVOIDANCE TECHNIQUES. 
Our team has been using Bro 2.5 as a logging and early-warning system for about a year now.  
After recording a sample of DNS traffic for several months my team was unable to find a single 
instance of a DNS request which was registered only 24 hours earlier.  If we configured our 
system to automatically block DNS requests to these domains, then even if a false positive were 
to occur it would self-resolve.  Triggering an alert in that period would give our network 
operations team ample time to find, isolate and respond to this condition.  Especially given the 
apparent rarity of the event.  
 
 What other kinds of OCC are there to be exploited?  Clearly any service which can be 
expected to exist on an Internet-connected machine is a good candidate. However, few are 
going to be as ubiquitous as DNS.  That said, since successful ransomware also requires an 
anonymous payment system (APS) it’s possible that these two could be combine.  There already 
exist facilities for embedding messages in the bitcoin blockchain such as Eternity Wall 
(https://eternitywall.it/).  Similarly it’s possible for the agent to be its own distributed service. 
Young and Yung outline a virus utilizing this approach in their aforementioned paper [10]. 
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, we have demonstrated that successful crypto-ransomware requires an Obfuscated 
Command Channel, which in successful crypto-ransomware depends on timely updates of their 
DNS records.  While there are many counter-measures for this kind of attack, few are both 
precise and proactive.  We have illustrated that by carefully denying access to domains that 
have been newly created we can eliminate this class of malware from affecting our systems.  
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